

Message Text

CONFIDENTIAL

PAGE 01 ISLAMA 10217 01 OF 03 291204Z

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ACTION SS-25

INFO OCT-01 ISO-00 SSO-00 CCO-00 NSCE-00 /026 W

----- 023472

O 291050Z OCT 74

FM AMEMBASSY ISLAMABAD

TO AMEMBASSY DACCA IMMEDIATE

INFO SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 7356

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 1 OF 3 ISLAMABAD 10217

EXDIS

FOR THE SECRETARY FROM BYROADE

E. O. 11652: GDS

TAGS: OVIP, PFOR, PINS, PK

SUBJECT: THE SECRETARY'S VISIT TO PAKISTAN

1. JUST A FEW THOUGHTS AS YOU WING YOURSELF TOWARDS PINDI.

2. DESPITE THE FACT THAT WE HAVE ONE INTENSE PROBLEM AFFECTING PAK-U.S. RELATIONSHIPS, I WOULD GUESS THAT YOU WOULD FIND YOUR STOPOVER HERE MORE EASYGOING THAN SOME YOU HAVE JUST BEEN THROUGH. BY THE VERY NATURE OF YOUR PERSONALITIES, YOU AND BHUTTO COULD SPEND INTERESTING HOURS TOGETHER WITH NO AGENDA AND NO BRIEFING PAPERS. THERE IS PROBABLY NOT A SINGLE FACET OF YOUR OWN THINKING ON THW WORLD ISSUES YOU ARE CONCERNING YOURSELF WITH THESE DAYS IN WHICH HE WOULD NOT TAKE A MORE THAN ORDINARY INTEREST. DESPITE HIS INTENSIVE PREOCCUPATION ON A SEVEN DAY WEEK BASIS WITH PAKISTAN'S INTERNAL AFFAIRS, HE STILL HAS TIME TO BE WELL-READ AND THOUGHTFUL ABOUT THINGS RANGING ALL THE WAY FROM BIG POWER RELATIONSHIPS TO THE IMPLICATIONS OF WORLD FOOD, FUEL, INFLATION, AND POPULATION PROBLEMS. HE WOULD BE INTENSELY INTERESTED, AND, I THINK, FLATTERED TO FEEL UP-TO-DATE ON YOUR VIEWS ON THE PROSPECTS FOR DETENTE, HOW U.S.-CHINESE RELATIONSHIPS MAY EVOLVE (HE ONCE SAID TO ME "WHEN ARE YOU GOING TO LIVE UP TO THE SHANGHAI COMMUNIQUE?"), THE MIDDLE EAST, CYPRUS,

CONFIDENTIAL

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PAGE 02 ISLAMA 10217 01 OF 03 291204Z

ETC.

3. REGARDLESS OF ALL THE ABOVE, THERE WILL BE ONE THOUGHT LURKING IN THE BACK OF BHUTTO'S MIND THAT WILL DISTRACT HIM FROM THESE BROAD CONCERNS UNTIL IT SURFACES AND IS HANDLED. THIS WILL TAKE THE FORM OF A QUESTIONMARK AS TO WHAT "REALLY" HAPPENED WHEN YOU WERE IN DELHI, AND TO A CONSIDERABLY LESSER EXTENT, IN DACCA. THIS PROMPTS THE SUGGESTION THAT IT MIGHT BE BEST AT AN EARLY STAGE IN YOUR TALKS TO TELL HIM AS MUCH AS YOU THINK YOU SHOULD ABOUT THOSE ASPECTS OF YOUR DISCUSSIONS AND IMPRESSIONS AT EACH OF YOUR PREVIOUS THREE STOPS WHICH WOULD BE OF DIRECT INTEREST TO HIM. I SUSPECT THAT THIS IN TURN WILL LEAD HIM TO SPEAK WITH GREATER CANDOR ABOUT HIS OWN VISIT TO MOSCOW AND ABOUT HIS ASSESSMENT OF PAKISTAN'S EVOLVING RELATIONSHIPS WITH INDIA AND BANGLADESH.

4. I WOULD PREDICT THAT OUR PRIMARY PROBLEM WITH THE PAKISTANIS, I.E., OUR MILITARY SUPPLY POLICY, WOULD NOT BE A HARD ONE FOR YOU TO HANDLE WHILE HERE, DESPITE THE INTENSITY OF PAK FEELINGS ON THE SUBJECT. BHUTTO RECOGNIZES THAT YOU, AND NOW PRESIDENT FORD, HARDLY NEED ANY ADDITIONAL BRIEFING ON THIS ISSUE. HE IS FAMILIAR, OF COURSE, WITH THE DISCUSSIONS AZIZ AHMED HAD WITH BOTH YOU AND THE PRESIDENT AND WILL NOT PRESS FOR ANY DECISION WHILE YOU ARE HERE. HE MAY, IN FACT, SPEND RELATIVELY VERY LITTLE TIME ON THIS SUBJECT. EVEN HE AND I SELDOM TALK ABOUT IT ANY MORE AS NEITHER OF US HAS VERY MUCH TO SAY THAT WE HAVEN'T SAID ALREADY. THERE ARE TIMES WHEN HE GETS HIMSELF INTO A MOOD OVER THIS QUESTION IN WHICH HE FINDS TALKING ABOUT IT PERSONALLY EMBARRASSING. I REMEMBER ONE TIME MENTIONING TO HIM THAT I WAS SURPRISED, CONSIDERING THE NATURE OF HIS AUDIENCE, THAT HE HAD BARELY MENTIONED THE SUBJECT TO A VISITING NATIONAL WAR COLLEGE GROUP. HE REPLIED THAT HIS PROBLEM WAS FULLY KNOWN TO MUCH HIGHER LEVELS AND HE SAW NOTHING TO BE ACCOMPLISHED BY PUTTING HIMSELF IN THE POSITION OF A BEGGER WHOSE WANTS COULD NOT BE SATISFIED.

5. DESPITE HIS MANY CONCERNS ABOUT THE EVOLVING MIX OF PAKISTAN'S FOREIGN, SECURITY AND ECONOMIC POLICIES, BHUTTO SHOULD BE IN A CONFIDENT MOOD WHEN HE MEETS WITH YOU. HE

CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL

PAGE 03 ISLAMA 10217 01 OF 03 291204Z

HAS PROBABLY NEVER BEEN STRONGER POLITICALLY SINCE HE TOOK CHARGE OF PAKISTAN IN THE SHAMBLES FOLLOWING THE 1971 WAR. IN THE LAST FEW MONTHS HE HAS BEEN RIDING A POLITICAL WINNING STREAK. IN SEPTEMBER HE DISPLAYED HIS CUSTOMARY ADOITNESS IN SUCCESSFULLY RESOLVING THE PROBLEM OF THE HETERODOX MUSLIM AHMEDIYA SECT IN A WAY WHICH WON HIM PARTICULAR PLAUDITS FROM CONSERVATIVE POLITICO-RELIGIOUS GROUPS WHICH HAD BEEN AMONG HIS STAUNCHEST CRITICS. ON

OCTOBER 15 HE FELT SUFFICIENTLY CONFIDENT ABOUT THE PROGRESS OF HIS MILITARY AND POLITICAL EFFORTS IN BALUCHISTAN TO DECLARE THAT ORGANIZED RESISTANCE TO AUTHORITY THERE HAD BEEN BROUGHT TO AN END. AND JUST LAST WEEK HE WENT AHEAD WITH THE FIRST WHOLESALE CHANGE IN HIS GOVERNMENT IN THE ALMOST THREE YEARS HE HAS BEEN IN OFFICE, BRINGING IN A HEALTHY INFUSION OF NEW TALENT AND DROPPING A FINANCE MINISTER WHOSE DOCTRINAIRE SOCIALIST POLICIES HAD BADLY DAMAGED PAKISTAN'S ECONOMY AND ALIENATED THE BUSINESS COMMUNITY.

CONFIDENTIAL

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PAGE 01 ISLAMA 10217 02 OF 03 291230Z

12

ACTION SS-25

INFO OCT-01 ISO-00 SSO-00 CCO-00 NSCE-00 /026 W

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O 291050Z OCT 74

FM AMEMBASSY ISLAMABAD

TO AMEMBASSY DACCA IMMEDIATE

INFO SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 7357

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 2 OF 3 ISLAMABAD 10217

EXDIS

6. I'M PARTICULARLY ENCOURAGED BY THIS LAST MOVE. AS I'VE REPORTED OVER THE YAR I'VE BEEN HERE, BHUTTO TENDS TO FOCUS MUCH MORE ON THE POLITICAL THAN ON THE ECONOMIC, AND THE RECORD OF HIS SUCCESSES AND FAILURES TENDS TO REFLECT THIS. THE CABINET CHANGES SEEM TO ME A FURTHER STEP ON HIS PART TOWARD A GREATER ACCEPTANCE OF THE ROLE OF PRIVATE ENTERPRISE AS A POSITIVE FORCE IN PAK ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT. HIS ADDRESS TO BUSINESSMEN THE DAY OF THE CABINET ANNOUNCEMENT--CERTAINLY THE MOST ENCOURAGING WORD HE HAS GIVEN THEM SINCE HE TOOK OFFICE ON AN AVOWEDLY SOCIALIST PLATFORM--SEEMS FURTHER CONFIRMATION OF MORE PRAGMATIC AND, FROM THE U.S. POINT OF VIEW, MORE PROMISING INDUSTRIAL AND COMMERCIAL POLICIES.

7. I'M NOT AS SANGUINE AS BHUTTO PROFESSES TO BE ABOUT A SOLUTION TO THE BALUCHISTAN PROBLEM. THE PAKS HAVE ALMOST CERTAINLY TURNED THE CORNER ON THAT TOUGH ISSUE, BUT

POLITICAL, ADMINISTRATIVE, AND SOCIAL DIFFICULTIES THERE ARE LIKELY TO CONTINUE TO GIVE BHUTTO HEADACHES FOR SOME TIME. THE AFGHANS ARE LIKELY TO TRY TO KEEP THE POT BOILING, IF ONLY BY PROPAGANDA, AND BHUTTO WILL CERTAINLY LET YOU KNOW HOW HE FEELS ABOUT WHAT HE CONSIDERS THEIR EFFORTS TO INTERVENE IN PAK INTERNAL AFFAIRS. MY OWN ADVICE WOULD BE THAT YOU REITERATE OUR LANG-STANDING RECOGNITION OF THE PRESENT PAK-AFGHAN FRONTIER (THE DURAND LINE), COUNSEL RESTRAINT ON BOTH SIDES, AND AVOID ANY MEDIATING ROLE.
CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL

PAGE 02 ISLAMA 10217 02 OF 03 291230Z

8. THE PAKS OFTEN TEND TO VIEW POLITICS IN CONSPIRATORIAL TERMS AND THE EVENTS OF 1971 AND THE CONVICTION THAT NEITHER AFGHANISTAN NOR INDIA ACCEPTS A FULLY SOVEREIGN, TERRITORIAALLY INTACT PAKISTAN HAVE ONLY NATURALLY HEIGHTENED THIS TENDENCY. BHUTTO MAY RAISE WITH YOU HIS SUSPICIONS OF ALLEGED COLLUSION BETWEEN KABUL AND DELHI, THOUGH IN A MORE MUTED FORM THAN HE WAS EMPLOYING PUBLICLY LAST SUMMER. I EXPECT THAT ON PAK-INDIA RELATIONS HE WILL BE PLEASED BY ANY REFERENCE YOU MAKE (AS YOU SURELY CAN) TO HIS STATESMAN-LIKE APPROACH TO THE NORMALIZATION PROCESS. BUT HE IS LIKELY TO GO ON TO TELL YOU OF THE LIMITATIONS OF THIS PROCESS IN RESOLVING PAK SECURITY CONCERNS VIS-A-VIS INDIA, AND TO DETAIL TO YOU THE BASIS OF PAK SUSPICIONS OF INDIAN INTENTIONS IN THE SUBCONTINENT. HE'LL HAVE MUCH LESS TO SAY ABOUT BANGLADESH--THE MOOD HERE ABOUT THE FORMER EASTERN WING NOW SEEMS TO BE A BLEND OF REGRET FOR THE EVENTS OF 1971, PITY FOR DACCA'S STATE IN 1974, AND A RATHER SMUG CONVICTION THAT THE EVENTS SINCE THE BREAKAWAY PROVE THAT THE OLD ASSOCIATION WAS MORE ADVANTAGEOUS TO THE EAST THAN IT WAS TO THE WEST.

9. ON THE ECONOMIC SIDE, I EXPECT BHUTTO WILL WISH TO TALK TO YOU ABOUT FOOD AID AND PERHAPS SOME OTHER ISSUES. WHILE WE DO NOT ANTICIPATE MASS STARVATION HERE, PAKISTAN MUST IMPORT SOME \$350 MILLION WORTH OF WHEAT AND VEGATABLE OIL OVER THE NEXT SIX MONTHS TO FEED THE URBAN POPULATION. (THIS WILL CONSUME ABOUT ONE-FORTH OF PAKISTAN'S FOREIGN EXCHANGE EARNINGS). WHILE BHUTTO WILL APPRECIATE OUR DECISION TO PROVIDE 100,000 TONS OF PL 480 WHEAT, THIS WILL REPRESENT SOMETHING LESS THAN TEN PRCENT OF HIS WHEAT IMPORT REQUIREMENTS. I WOULD EXPECT HIM TO PRESS HARD FOR AT LEAST A SECOND 100,000 TONS, AND I HOPE WE CAN BE AS POSITIVE AS POSSIBLE ABOUT THE PROSPECTS FOR THIS. BHUTTO MAY ALSO PRESS YOU ON VEGATABLE OIL CITING OUR CONDITIONAL PROMISES OF AID. EVEN IN THE FACE OF OUR BAD SOYBEAN CROP, BHUTTO HOPES WE CAN MAKE A CONTRIBUTION TOWARDS THIS REQUIREMENT.

10. BHUTTO MAY ALSO RAISE WITH YOU HIS LONG-RANGE GOAL OF MAKING PAKISTAN SELF-SUFFICIENT IN FOOD, PARTICULARLY AS CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL

PAGE 03 ISLAMA 10217 02 OF 03 291230Z

YOU WILL BE GOING TO THE WORLD FOOD CONFERENCE. WITH SIZEABLE FOREIGN AID, HE BELIEVES THIS GOAL CAN BE ACHIEVED. UNTIL PAKISTAN ACHIEVES SELF-SUFFICIENCY IN FERTILIZER PRODUCTION, WHICH WILL OCCUR IN ABOUT A DECADE'S TIME, IT WILL NEED TO IMPORT LARGE QUANTITIES OF FERTILIZERS. THE BILL FOR THIS OVER THE NEXT FIVE YEARS WILL BE ABOUT \$1 BILLION. FORTHERMORE, TO LICK THE PROBLEMS OF WATERLOGGING AND SALINITY AND TO IMPROVE WATER MANAGEMENT IN GENERAL WILL COST OVER A PERIOD OF 10 OR 15 YEARS ANOTHER \$2 TO \$3 BILLION. IT HAPPENS THAT OUR AID PROGRAM IS FINANCING SOME FERTILIZER IMPORTS AND IS PROVIDING TECHNICAL HELP ON THE WATER MANAGEMENT SIDE. ON THE OTHER HAND, MOST OF THE MONEY FOR THESE PROGRAMS IS GOING TO HAVE TO COME FROM OTHERS, INCLUDING PARTICULARLY THE OIL-RICH COUNTRIES. IF HE BRINGS THIS LONG-RANGE PROGRAM UP, I HOPE YOU CAN ENCOURAGE HIM BY PERHAPS DISCUSSING WITH HIM DIEAS YOU MAY HAVE FOR ACCELERATING THE FLOW OF FUNDS FROM THE OIL PRODUCERS.

11. I MENTIONED ABOVE THAT BHUTTO WILL WANT TO TRADE NOTES WITH YOU ON THE VISITS THE TWO OF YOU MADE TO MOSCOW LAST WEEK. FROM A BRIEF EXCHANGE WITH AGHA SHAHI, I GATHER THAT THE PAK-SOVIET MEETINGS WENT WELL AS FAR AS THE GENERAL ATMOSPHERE WAS CONCERNED. HE SAID KOSYGIN HAD BEEN AFFABLE AND LAUNCHED INTO A LENGTHY SPEECH AT DINNER THE FIRST NIGHT WHEN IT HAD BEEN UNDERSTOOD THERE WOULD BE NO SPEECHES. HE SAID HE WAS MOST IMPRESSIVE IN HIS DETAILED KNOWLEDGE OF THE PROSPECTS OF FINDING OIL AND GAS IN PAKISTAN AND IN HIS OFFER OF SOVIET ASSISTANCE. HE SAID BHUTTO HAD REFUSED TO ACCEPT ANY WORKING IN THE COMMUNIQUE THAT WOULD SHOW ANY INCLINATION TOWARDS THE SOVIET ASIAN SECURITY SYSTEM AND THIS HAD BEEN ACCEPTED WITHOUT ACRIMONY. IN THIS CONTEXT, BHUTTO HAD NATURALLY NOT ASKED FOR MILITARY ASSISTANCE.

CONFIDENTIAL

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PAGE 01 ISLAMA 10217 03 OF 03 291228Z

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ACTION SS-25

INFO OCT-01 ISO-00 SSO-00 CCO-00 NSCE-00 /026 W

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O 291050Z OCT 74

FM AMEMBASSY ISLAMABAD

TO AMEMBASSY DACCA IMMEDIATE

INFO SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 7358

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 3 OF 3 ISLAMABAD 10217

EXDIS

12. IN THEIR DRAFT OF THE COMMUNIQUE, THE SOVIETS HAD PUT IN FOUR ITEMS ON WHICH THERE WAS CLEAR SOVIET-CHINESE DISAGREEMENT. THE PAKS HAD REFUSED TO GO ALONG WITH ANY OF THESE OUT OF DEFERENCE TO THEIR POSITION WITH CHINA, WHICH THEY EXPLAINED TO THE SOVIETS ANTE-DATED SOVIET-CHINESE DISAGREEMENTS. THE SOVIETS APPARENTLY ACCEPTED THIS POSITION WITHOUT TOO MUCH ARGUMENT. THE SOVIET DRAFT ASKED THE PAKS TO AGREE THAT THE "POLITICAL DISCORD" BETWEEN PAKISTAN AND AFGHANISTAN BE SETTLED BY "NEGOTIATION." THE PAKS FIRST SUCCEEDED IN GETTING THE WORDS "POLITICAL DISCORD" DROPPED FOR "DIFFERENCES", AND THEN GOT SOVIET AGREEMENT TO ADD THAT THESE SHOULD BE SETTLED BY PEACEFUL MEANS THROUGH NEGOTIATIONS "ON THE BASIS ON THE PRINCIPLES OF PEACEFUL COEXISTENCE", I.E., ACCEPTANCE OF TERRITORIAL INTEGRITY AND NON-INTERFERENCE IN INTERNAL AFFAIRS. SHAHI SAID THE SOVIETS WERE FORTHCOMING ON THE 228 MILLION (DOLLAR EQUIVALENT) BALANCE ON THEIR STEEL MILL PROJECT NEAR KARACHI BUT ONLY TIME WOULD TELL WHETHER THE WOULD GO THE FULL AMMOUNT. SOVIETS ALSO TOLD BHUTTO THAT MUJIBUR RAHMAN WOULD COMPROMISE ON HIS EXTREMEM POSITIONS RE SHARING OF ASSETS AND THE BIHARIS (A FURTHER INDICATION THAT SOVIETS WERE TRYING TO PRESENT THEMSELVES IN A "MOTHERLY" STANE OF TRYING TO ASSIST IN MAKING THINGS "COME OUT RIGHT" IN THE SUBCONTINENT). IN GENERAL, SHAHI SAID THE MEETINGS WENT FAIRLY WELL, WITH RESULTS ONLY IN GENERAL TERMS, BUT HE FELT IT PROBABLY GOOD THAT SOVIETS UNDERSTOOD BETTER PAKISTANI VIEWPOINTS. HE SAID HE UNDERSTOOD THAT THE SMALLER

CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL

PAGE 02 ISLAMA 10217 03 OF 03 291228Z

MEETING WITH BHUTTO AND BREZHNEV WENT OFF WELL, BUT HE DID NOT AS YET HAVE MUCH READ-OUT.

13. IN ADDITION TO AZIZ AHMED AND AGHA SHAHI, I FIND NOW THAT RAFI RAZA AND AMBASSADOR YAQUB KHAN WILL BE ADDED TO

THEIR SIDE FOR THE MAIN TALKS, WHICH IS A TOTAL OF VIE.
RAFI RAZA, THE SENIOR CABINET MEMBER WHO WILL BE AT THE
AIRPORT, IS AN EXCEEDINGLY ABLE AND YOUNG PROTEGE OF BHUTTO
WHO HAS RECENTLY MOVED FROM SENATE TO CABINET POSITION.
WE ARE SENDING SEPARATELY BIO DATA ON RAZA AND HIS WIFE.
ALSO, I UNDERSTAND THAT FOOD ADVISER BUCHA AND SECRETARY
OF FINANCE KAZI WILL BE STANDING BY IN THE WINGS. IN VIEW
OF THE LATTER, I PROPOSE TO HAVE OUR ECONOMIC COUNSELOR,
AMSTUTZ, AND AID DIRECTOR, WHEELER, ALSO STANDING BY IN
CASE THE DISCUSSION GETS DETAILED. WITH THIS SIZE DELEGATION
I WOULD EXPECT, AND INDEED WOULD HOPE, THAT YOU AND BHUTTO
WILL FIND SOME TIME TO BEHGLONG AS THIS ALWAYS HELPS WITH
PERSONAL RELATIONSHIPS WHICH ARE SO IMPORTANT TO BHUTTO.

14. I WOULD FULLY EXPECT BHUTTO TO MAKE SOME UNUSUAL
GESTURE TO SIGNIFY HIS APPRECIATION OF YOUR VISIT HERE
AND ITS IMPORTANCE. JUST WHAT SURPRISES HE MAY COME UP
WITH, I DO NOT KNOW. I HAD THOUGHT HE AND BEGUM BHUTTO MIGHT
BE AT THE AIRPORT, BUT I DOUBT THIS NOW AS I DO NOT BELIEVE
BEGUM BHUTTO WILL RETURN TO THE CAPITAL UNTIL UST AFTER
YOUR ARRIVAL. ALSO, I DO NOT BELIEVE BHUTTO BOUGHT OUR
SUGGESTION OF NO GIFTS, SO IT MIGHT BE WELL FOR YOUR
STAFF TO HAVE SOMETHING HANDY. HAPPY LANDING*
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Message Attributes

Automatic Decaptioning: Z
Capture Date: 01 JAN 1994
Channel Indicators: n/a
Current Classification: UNCLASSIFIED
Concepts: MINISTERIAL VISITS, DIPLOMATIC DISCUSSIONS
Control Number: n/a
Copy: SINGLE
Draft Date: 29 OCT 1974
Decaption Date: 28 MAY 2004
Decaption Note: 25 YEAR REVIEW
Disposition Action: RELEASED
Disposition Approved on Date:
Disposition Authority: boyleja
Disposition Case Number: n/a
Disposition Comment: 25 YEAR REVIEW
Disposition Date: 28 MAY 2004
Disposition Event:
Disposition History: n/a
Disposition Reason:
Disposition Remarks:
Document Number: 1974ISLAMA10217
Document Source: CORE
Document Unique ID: 00
Drafter: n/a
Enclosure: n/a
Executive Order: GS
Errors: N/A
Film Number: D740307-0849
From: ISLAMABAD
Handling Restrictions: n/a
Image Path:
ISecure: 1
Legacy Key: link1974/newtext/t19741011/aaaaaiog.tel
Line Count: 355
Locator: TEXT ON-LINE, ON MICROFILM
Office: ACTION SS
Original Classification: CONFIDENTIAL
Original Handling Restrictions: EXDIS
Original Previous Classification: n/a
Original Previous Handling Restrictions: n/a
Page Count: 7
Previous Channel Indicators:
Previous Classification: CONFIDENTIAL
Previous Handling Restrictions: EXDIS
Reference: n/a
Review Action: RELEASED, APPROVED
Review Authority: boyleja
Review Comment: n/a
Review Content Flags:
Review Date: 12 JUN 2002
Review Event:
Review Exemptions: n/a
Review History: RELEASED <12 JUN 2002 by boyleja>; APPROVED <11 MAR 2003 by boyleja>
Review Markings:

Declassified/Released
US Department of State
EO Systematic Review
30 JUN 2005

Review Media Identifier:
Review Referrals: n/a
Review Release Date: n/a
Review Release Event: n/a
Review Transfer Date:
Review Withdrawn Fields: n/a
Secure: OPEN
Status: NATIVE
Subject: THE SECRETARY'S VISIT TO PAKISTAN
TAGS: OVIP, PFOR, PINS, PK, (KISSINGER, HENRY A)
To: DACCA
Type: TE
Markings: Declassified/Released US Department of State EO Systematic Review 30 JUN 2005